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ABSTRACT

Accession to international governmental organizations (IGOs) has become an
important corollary of modern international relations. Not only have IGOs proliferated
significantly over the past fifty years, but, institutionalist paradigms, such as World Polity
theory, suggest membership to such entities is inherent to the definition of modern
statehood. Although IGO accession is rather commonplace, a full understanding of the
motivation and gains associated with such commitments is not fully established. The
current project contributes to this scholarly debate by applying World Polity theory to the
question of why IGOs actively invite certain states into membership negotiations. The
author employs a survival analysis in order to better describe factors, including World
Polity indicators, that contribute positively to the rate at which this process occurs. By
framing the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as an
anomalous, selective IGO, the author identifies conditions under which membership
invitations are made, and how participation within the World Polity influences accession
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outcomes. Results indicate that involvement in the world market economy as well as
domestic financial stability are strongly associated with more recent membership activity;
however, political factors including World Polity measures prove to be significant as
well.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL MOTIVATION

The goal this study is to better understand the factors underlying accession
proceedings initiated by international governmental organizations (IGOs), specifically
those derived from organizations with decidedly non-universal membership such as the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). This work is best
situated within the subfield of international relations research that attempts to understand
the functions of IGOs within the global community, and the reasons underlying states‟
involvement with such entities.
The current project expands upon more general theory pertaining to states‟
interactions within IGOs.

Theoretical debates regarding these relations are decided

mixed and by no means resolved. At first glance, it would appear that the gains from
membership within such groups must certainly outweigh the losses from remaining
outside the institutions. Yet political theory is rife with contrasting hypotheses regarding
not only the reasons underlying such involvement but also rationales under which
accession may not be preferable under all circumstances (Doyle 1997; Griego 1988;
Keohane 1986; Waltz 1954). A growing body of research suggests that states may
accede to international organizations in order to gain legitimacy, to convey and
accumulate international norms, and, most importantly, to achieve cooperative outcomes
within an anarchic world system. Yet, other research suggests that IGO membership
infringes on state sovereignty and is easily circumvented by unmediated negotiations
amongst states.
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In addition, scholars debate the relative power and ability of IGOs to regulate
state behavior. While some would argue that IGOs are merely „tools of statecraft‟
incapable of autonomous action, others contend that IGOs are fully capable of
independent activity that may provide a constraining influence on national leaders.
However, despite the apparent theoretical appeal, few quantitative projects, if any, have
studied the autonomous behavior of IGOs, and, in particular, the decision to invite states
into membership negotiations. Thus, both empirically and theoretically, there is much
room for continued research on the role of international organizations with the global
system, their potential function(s) as autonomous units, and the politics underlying states‟
growing involvement with these spheres of influence.
This study emphasizes the potential importance of World Polity theory in terms of
contributing to a general understanding of IGO membership patterns. A more detailed
description of this approach to international relations is presented below.

In brief,

however, the World Polity framework takes uniquely sociological and phenomenological
approach to understanding the role of culture within international outcomes. Unlike
previous theories emphasizing individual agency and the actions of nations as the primary
unit of study, the World Polity paradigm highlights the primacy of institutions.

By

bringing institutions- comprised of both state and non-state actors with specified
behavioral expectations- to the forefront, the World Polity paradigm opens the door for
the study institutional isomorphism within and across international borders over time.
The World Polity represents a cognitive milieu in which nations and international
organizations exist. This cognitive context shapes and is shaped by organizations; thus, it
offers a unique lens through which one may better understand the function of such
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entities within the international system. Although this theory has been applied to various
aspects of the international relations subfield with confirmed success; its application to
international organizations, and membership patterns, in particular, has been somewhat
limited (Beckfield 2003; Beckfield 2008; Cao 2009; Hughes, et al. 2009; Kelley 2004;
Schimmelfennig 2005).
As a result, the current project advances this subfield by focusing on IGO
administration in terms of granting membership invitations, rather than depicting the
initiation of such processes by potential member states. By studying the accession rates
of a single, selective IGO, namely, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), this study also contributes to the broader theoretical debate
regarding autonomy and utility of non-state entities within the international system.
The process through which nations accede to the OECD, whose members are
listed in Table One, is an ideal in situ experiment for several reasons. First, although the
organization has been in existence for over fifty years, it is only within the last several
decades that its membership has truly begun to grow. This raises questions of factors
underlying the recent exponential growth in membership invitations, and characteristics
which best predict the likelihood of similar negotiations in the future.
In addition, the OECD, as a prototypical IGO, is relatively understudied. For
instance, literature exists regarding membership within other entities such as the
European Union, the International Monetary Fund, the International Labor Organization,
and the World Trade Organization (Schneider 2007; Strang and Chang 1993). Yet, to
date, there is a dearth of quantitative studies focused solely on the history and features of
the OECD.
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Table One: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
Member Nations (Source: OECD 2010)
Country
Finland
Canada
United States
United Kingdom
Denmark
Iceland
Norway
Turkey
Spain
Portugal
France
Ireland
Belgium
Germany
Greece
Sweden
Switzerland
Austria
Netherlands
Luxembourg
Italy
Japan
Australia
New Zealand
Mexico
Czech Republic
Hungary
Poland
Korea, South
Slovak Republic
Chile
Slovenia
Israel
Estonia
Enhanced
Engagement
Nations
Brazil
China
India
Indonesia
Russia
South Africa

Date of Membership Ratification
January 28, 1961
April 10, 1961
April 12, 1961
May 2, 1961
May 30, 1961
June 5, 1961
July 4, 1961
August 2, 1961
August 3, 1961
August 4, 1961
August 7, 1961
August 17, 1961
September 13, 1961
September 27, 1961
September 27, 1961
September 28, 1961
September 28, 1961
September 29, 1961
November 13, 1961
December 7, 1961
March 29, 1962
April 28, 1964
June 7, 1971
May 29, 1973
May 18, 1994
December 21, 1995
May 7, 1996
November 22, 1996
December 12, 1996
December 14, 2000
May 7, 2010
July 21, 2010
September 7, 2010
December 9, 2010

Date Negotiations Began
May, 2007
May, 2007
May, 2007
May, 2007
May, 2007
May, 2007
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Furthermore, OECD membership is deliberately non-universal. Unlike larger
entities such as the United Nations, the World Bank, or the World Health Organization,
accession to the OECD is both selective and discretionary. Thus, the rate at which
countries will join the organization will necessarily vary; in addition, some nations will
remain perpetually outside the group of those receiving invitations. This factor both
distinguishes the OECD from other, more-global organizations, and contributes its
overall appeal as a subject of statistical analysis. As a result, the choice of the dependent
variable is both unique to the extant literature on the history of the OECD, and relatively
unstudied in terms of the knowledge base regarding IGO memberships more generally.
This project emphasizes the contribution of World Polity theory, which was
originally articulated by John Meyer and his colleagues, to international relations, and
attempts to test the relevance of this theoretical orientation for understanding IGO
membership. Participation in the World Polity is operationalized as the rate at which
national leaders accede to treaty agreements. This choice of indicator is suggested by
previous research; yet, to date, variables of this nature have not been applied to
quantitative analysis of accession patterns.
Additional covariates within the project include those most closely associated
with the mandate of the organization itself.

Briefly, OECD leaders describe the

organization as one in which membership is most focused on (1) economically developed
nations that represent adherence to (2) market mechanisms and (3) democratic
governance. As result, these factors are included as key controls with the study.
In addition to its theoretical contributions, this research represents a unique
statistical methodology which has not yet been explored within the existing publications
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pertaining to IGO memberships. In order to better assess the pattern of OECD accession,
the author employs a Cox proportionate hazard rate analysis. Pooled panels of nationallevel data for 131 countries beginning with the year 1980 are employed to in order to
understand the most active period of OECD membership from 1980 until 2010. The time
period of interest was selected based on data availability as well as the fact that the
majority of new accessions to the OECD have occurred during the last thirty years.
Duration models offer one of the best and most informative methods for analyzing
specific rates of change over time. This method stands in distinct contrast with the
majority of previous studies of IGO membership patterns, which may be characterized as
either (1) qualitative case studies or (2) linear regression analyses. As a result, the choice
of survival analysis methodology represents an important contribution of the present
study.
In sum, the current project builds upon previous research on IGO membership
through several distinct channels. The dependent variable, i.e. OECD accession rates, is
both understudied and somewhat counterintuitive. A more complete history of OECD
membership and mandate is provided within the body of the document. The author also
offers a thorough rationale for the selection of the OECD as a dependent variable.
Furthermore, this project presents a unique application and test of the World
Polity paradigm as it applies to the population of IGOs and their respective members.
This research articulates the World Polity theory as it historically relates to both domestic
and international outcomes. The author also provides an overview of research linking
World Polity concepts to international relations, and IGOs, in particular.
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The third and final contribution of this work is the unique choice of methodology.
A complete description of the Cox Hazard rate as a specific functional form of survival
analysis is detailed below. The author underscores selection of this model over other
potential alternatives. In addition, this research articulates the more general set-up of the
quantitative model, which lays the foundation for discussion of variable selection and
analysis. The remaining sections of the document detail the quantitative analysis, supply
results, and offer discussion.
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CHAPTER TWO
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

In 1948, representatives from European nations joined together to create the
Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). This entity was formed to
execute the Marshall Plan and facilitate European reconstruction in the aftermath of
World War II. Over the next decade, however, the economic recovery of European
nations proved to be relatively rapid. Thus, whether or not the outcome was a direct
result of OEEC action, the organization‟s initial aims were effectively realized (Ohlin
1968). Yet, rather than dismantle the organization after achieving its founding mandate,
national leaders elected to perpetuate the OEEC. Opportunities to further benefit from
the established administrative framework and avenues for international cooperation may
have contributed to this outcome. Beginning in 1960, the OEEC was expanded to include
the United States and Canada; in 1961, it was officially reincarnated as the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
In the early years after its founding, the administration‟s operational objectives
were primarily economic in nature. Its goals included (1) promotion of economic growth
from within underdeveloped non-member nations, and (2) coordination of policy in order
to promote „trade, growth, and stability‟ from amongst current members (Ohlin 1968).
Authors, such as Ohlin (1968), note that economic assistance, including coordination of
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capital flows, to developing nations encompassed an increasingly larger portion of OECD
operations over time.
Over the past fifty years, the OECD‟s primary mandate has not deviated
dramatically from its foundational aims. The organization‟s self-proclaimed purpose is
to,

“...achieve sustainable economic growth and employment and to raise the
standard of living in member countries while maintaining financial stability... in
order to contribute to the development of the world economy (OECD 2010).”

Yet, in the present, the OECD administration identifies its primary purpose as the
preservation and promotion of not only financial, but also international political, aims.
More specifically, the contemporary administration identifies the support of market
economies and the encouragement of democratic governance as key goals for future
interactions with developing nations (OECD 2010).
Thus, although the founding of the organization occurred with primarily financial
motives, the OECD administration has subsequently adopted political ends as well. This
development situates both OECD member nations and non-member affiliates within a
new light, and begs further analysis. For instance, observers might question the relative
importance of political orientation, in tandem with other economic factors, for OECD
membership. Inquiries such as these contribute directly to the objectives of the current
project.
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Over the past fifty years, OECD membership has nearly doubled and its
international relations span the globe.

Present membership has expanded from the

original group of twenty nations to include thirty-four full members. See also Table One
above. In addition, the OECD has extended membership discussions, formally called
enhanced engagement status, to six additional nations: Brazil, China, India, Indonesia
Russia, and South Africa.

Membership negotiation is a lengthy process involving

extensive review, examination, and policy adjustment.

The sheer volume of

correspondence and negotiations between the OECD administration and potential
member nations ensures that only a few countries accede at one time (OECD 2010).
Yet, formal accession proceedings only scratch the surface of the organization‟s
extensive international partnerships. The OECD‟s Global Relations Secretariat (GRS)
maintains collaborative relationships with over seventy non-member nations.

Thus,

explicit OECD membership represents only a fraction of the OECD‟s international
relations and sphere of influence.

It is precisely because of such nonmember

partnerships, that the OECD accession process holds such theoretical interest for students
of international organizations.
The OECD deliberately fosters productive working relationships with nonmember
nations, and the accession process often involves pronounced policy adjustments. The
tension created by these two factors places the motivation for OECD membership into
question. More directly, if cooperation between the OECD and non-member nations is
not only probable, but likely, the question remains, why join the organization at all?
It is worth reemphasizing that accession requires extensive amendment of
political and economic factors by potential member nations.
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Politically, domestic

governments are constrained on certain levels by membership criteria; they must
relinquish a certain degree of power, even if only superficially, in order to recognize the
validity of organizational policy as well as the rights of other members. In addition,
membership approval often requires substantial domestic policy changes in order to bring
national economies into conformity with organizational guidelines. In light of the more
general international relations theory on this topic, the combined loss of power and
necessity of economic adjustment required for membership is certainly non-trivial.
However, we observe empirically that national governments not only continue
their organizational membership over long stretches of time- the twenty original member
nations are still active- but membership has nearly doubled since the OECD‟s inception
in 1961. Since its founding, fourteen other countries, including Chile, Estonia, Slovenia,
and Israel- all of whom joined during 2010, have acceded to the OECD. (Please see the
complete list of OECD member nations and accession dates presented in Table One.) In
addition, several other nations are currently applying for membership status. As of 2007,
the OECD invited Russia into membership discussions, while simultaneously allowing
five other nations to enter into enhanced engagement. Clearly, national leaders find value
in OECD membership. What is less obvious are the reasons underlying the extension of
membership invitations to a few nations in particular, to the neglect of other countries
from similar geographic locations with parallel political and economic characteristics.
This apparent asymmetry in membership invitations is the primary motivation underlying
the current analysis.
To further underscore the significance of this incongruence, consider three
superficial examples.

For instance, take note of the emerging economies within

11

Southeast Asia.

Japan and South Korea acceded to the OECD in 1964 and 1996,

respectively. However, only in the last three years have Indonesia, China, and India
begun membership negotiations.

Arguably, more recent economic growth may

contribute to this finding. Yet contemporary economic growth is not capable of fully
explaining other patterns within the region.
Of the four Asian Tigers, namely Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South
Korea, only South Korea is a member of the OECD. The three other nations, Singapore,
Hong Kong, and Taiwan, lack any current connection with the group. Thus, despite the
fact that the OECD has publicly identified Southeast Asia as an area of strategic interest
(OECD 2010), few of the dominant economies within the region have either joined or
entered negotiations to join the OECD. This apparent contradiction warrants further
analysis.
Similar questions may be raised with respect to Central and South American
countries. Note that Mexico was admitted into the OECD during May of 1994. This
event occurred only a few months after the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) entered into force in January. It is possible that this proximity is purely
circumstantial; however, quantitative analysis may point to a deeper relation. In addition,
although Chile recently acceded to the OECD in 2010; the Brazilian administration,
which entered into enhanced engagement in 2007, has only just begun the process of
membership negotiations.
These countries stand in sharp contrast with other high-income, non-member
countries within the region. For example, Argentina has a per capita income exceeding
that of OECD members Chile, Turkey, and Mexico, yet the Argentinean government is
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not currently engaged with the OECD. Similar arguments may be made with respect to
Uruguay and Panama; their incomes are intermediate amongst the current OECD
population, yet neither has entered into accession dialogue.
It is arguable that because the OECD was founded in France, and originally
composed of European nations, combined with a select smattering of countries from
other areas, perhaps recent membership patterns may be best articulated in terms of
geographic proximity to current members. Yet, analysis of OECD membership patterns
amongst European nations is not as straightforward as it might appear. Given the fact
that six Eastern European countries (Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, and Estonia) have joined the OECD since 1995, it seems fairly obvious that
historical factors have played a direct role in recent membership. After the official end of
Soviet dominance throughout the region in 1991, it appears as though numerous former
Soviet bloc countries entered into membership negotiations with the OECD over the
following decade.
For select countries, it appears as though membership patterns with the OECD
closely parallel entry into the European Union in the years following 1991. For example,
Estonia, Hungary, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia entered the EU in 2004, and all four
countries are now OECD members. (See Table One for accession dates.) However, there
are other countries within the Balkan region that have actively sought membership with
the European Union (EU), but may or may not be engaged in talks with the OECD. For
instance, Romania and Bulgaria both joined the EU in 2007, yet neither country is
engaged with the OECD.
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It suffices to state that the membership disparities across Eastern Europe, as well
as similar patterns with Southeast Asia, Central America, and South America, can not be
fully understood through case study alone. As a result, the current endeavor attempts to
illuminate more subtle trends that may better explain the apparent inconsistency in
membership invitations. The purpose of this project is to employ statistical analysis in
order to increase our theoretical understanding of the domestic and international
conditions underlying OECD accession patterns.

The Political Economy of International Organizations

The function of international organizations within the anarchic world system
remains a key topic of debate among scholars of international relations. Several authors
support the notion that these non-state actors facilitate the provision of public goods
within the international arena (Abbott and Snidal 1998; Keohane and Martin 1995;
Kindleberger 1986). Authors such as Keohane (1984) and Nielson and Tierney (2003)
have commented that IGOs are adept at addressing, “...Coase's classic problems of
information asymmetries, transaction costs, and the absence of property rights.” These
types of public goods may be tangible, such as peacekeeping troops or financial aid, or
intangible, such as norms of environmental protection or regulated trading (Finlayson and
Zacher 1981). Although this justification is certainly logical; it is incomplete. As is the
case with most public goods, it is arguable that public services at the international level,
or, at a minimum, cooperative multilateral outcomes involving only a few nations, are
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subject to inherent free rider problems in which states that are not directly involved with
particular agreements still receive benefits from such international arrangements.
A case in point is international military stability. States may not be members of
organizations designed to provide this outcome, such as the United Nations or North
Atlantic Treaty Organization; however, they recoup the benefits of peaceful international
relations nevertheless.

Similar indirect examples of free rider problems pervasive

throughout that international system may be drawn with respect to several other
institutions. For instance, aid provided by the international development banks reduces
overall economic instability in the international system; thus, preventing international
financial and banking crises. Humanitarian health provisions and research initiatives
initiated by the World Health Organization offer indirect benefits to nonmember nations
by improving the overall health conditions within the world system as a whole and thus
reducing the likelihood of the spread of epidemic diseases. Finally, trade regulations
fostering greater international interaction with fewer restrictions provided by the World
Trade Organization aid the economic relations of all trading nations regardless of whether
states are actually members of this group.
As a result, the author argues that while functional arguments may explain the
mere existence of IGOs within the international framework, this type of logic is simply
insufficient to explicate the incentives driving nations to join these entities. Although this
point is certainly not novel, it is by no means trivial (Keohane and Martin 1995;
Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001; Moravcsik 1997). Functionalist arguments, such
as those propounded by Jacobson, Reisinger, and Mathers (1986), simply can not explain
the motivation driving states to relinquish certain elements of sovereignty by acceding to
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such groups. Thus, one must rely on more intangible aspects of relevant outcomes that,
in a sense, anthropomorphize state action and introduce non-fungible assets associated
with IGO membership.
The question of identifying the motivation, especially from the leaders of less
powerful states, for pursuing IO membership remains unresolved. As a result, the study
of accession and its associated effects has been refined in recent years to focus on two
key outcomes (Barkin and Cronin 1994; Checkel 2005; Gheciu 2005; Gray 2009; HafnerBurton 2005; Hathaway 2007; Kelley 2004; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006;
Schimmelfennig 2005). The primary argument underlying IGO membership patterns is
the academic debate regarding the tradeoff between reputation effects and national
sovereignty.

Increasing international legitimacy through political and economic

allegiances as well as productive policy cooperation benefit the reputation of
international leaders and domestic governments while offering increasing incentives to
IGO membership. It is safe to assume the legitimacy associated purely with membership
applies equally to all members regardless of domestic criteria such as financial resources.
However, it follows that governments starting from a point of lower perceived
legitimacy, such as those of recently founded nations, politically unstable or transitioning
nations, or economically underdeveloped nations, may gain more in the way of private
utility from such benefits than national governments with well-established international
reputations. Additional advantages may include avenues such as the opportunity to
acquire policy insights; openness to networking and communication with other diplomats
and national leaders; social capital in terms of ensuring the legitimacy of domestic
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governments; and indirect credibility in support of domestic receipt of international aid,
loans, trading agreements, etc.
However, the loss of sovereignty sustained by acceding nations undergoing
„socialization‟ (Checkel 2005) into IGOs mitigates against incentives to join these
organizations. This deficit is commonly operationalized as the domestic policy changes
that must occur prior to membership so that countries may align themselves domestically
with policies dictated by the organization.

In addition, these changes must be

perpetuated into the future as nations maintain their status within the IGO. Intuitively,
this loss of sovereignty is most likely to be observed in nations that have less control over
administration and operations of the organization itself. This may include either nonfounding member states or member states excluded from governing bodies such as the
United Nations Security Council.
It may be assumed that high income, high military strength countries already
maintain a fair degree of influence within the international system as a diffuse whole.
Thus, there is little direct gain from joining IGOs unless these types of countries have
controlling influence over the IGO. This may explain why the United States is a strong
participant in organizations such as the Bretton Woods institutions (the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund), but a non-signatory on other treaties such as the Kyoto
Protocol and the Rome Statute (International Criminal Court).
A method of testing this proposition might be to include measures such as (a)
founding members or (b) governing body members as an indicator in quantitative studies.
For instance, the UN Security Council comes to mind a governing body distinct from the
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other UN memberships per se. This type of measure might best explain the involvement
of very wealthy nations within certain groups and is left for future research.
The primary goal of this study is to better understand the role of legitimacy and
similar intangible incentives for less powerful nations to accede to IGOs. As suggested
above, benefits inherently linked to control of organizations are simply unavailable to
less powerful countries. Thus, for less powerful nations in particular, the debate returns
to the trade-off between sovereignty and reputation. Both effects are magnified in the
case of less powerful, less wealthy nations for all of the reasons detailed above.

The

current study offers a lens in which we may reassess this debate and, hopefully,
contribute to our knowledge of this perplexing dynamic.
Legitimating factors are non-fungible and, by definition, very difficult to measure.
Although several scholars have suggested this aspect in terms of increasing our
understanding of IGO participation, empirical studies, and quantitative studies in
particular, have made little progress in terms of definitely answering the question of
whether reputation effects are strong enough to outweigh the loss of sovereignty that
accompanies IGO membership (Abbott and Snidal 1998; Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986;
Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006). It goes without saying that if benefits of status always
outweighed the loss of national sovereignty, then IGO memberships should be expected
to indiscriminately increase. Yet, this is not what one observes within the international
system. The author argues that, precisely because OECD membership is so selective, that
OECD accession rates provide an ideal in situ experiment with which to test such
hypotheses.
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OECD accession rates offer an optimal natural experiment with which to test
hypothesis regarding incentives underlying IGO accession more generally.

The

organization has existed for over fifty years. It is safe to assume that bylaws created by
founding members have been fairly solidified over time; thus, the organizational
administration and mandate is both relatively well-established and less liable to change.
In addition, founding membership of the OECD already includes the wealthiest nations in
the world- the Western European countries, the Unites States, Canada, and Japan. Thus,
in light of the length of organizational existence and prior membership, one may
conclude that new member nations are both (1) less likely to have organizational control,
and (2) less financially and militarily well-endowed than existing members. These facts
increase the relevance of reputations effects in terms of our comprehension of recent
OECD accession. In light of parallel sovereignty losses, it is unclear as to why less
powerful nations continue to join an organization in which they have little opportunity for
control.
In addition, consider OECD membership in contrast with other IGOs, such as the
United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, the World Trade Organization, and the
World Health Organization. The primary difference between memberships within these
organizations, in contrast with the OECD, is that the loss of sovereignty is offset by
fungible assets. Benefits such as financial assistance, international development and
stability loans, peacekeeping troops, and humanitarian aid accompany membership
within these organizations.

Yet, the OECD does not offer similar benefits to its

members. As detailed above, not only is OECD membership unaccompanied by fungible
assets, but any benefits associated with OECD activity are also available to coordinating
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nonmember nations. As a result, the OECD is singular amongst IGOs, which only serves
increase the intrigue of its recent membership increases.
The above considerations of plausible gains and losses for membership in IGOs
indicates that countries are likely to desire and maintain membership if they have
substantial influence within the organization , and if their prestige in the international
community is enhanced by membership. Thus:

H1:

Founding nations are likely to maintain their membership within the
OECD.

H2:

Countries with characteristics that parallel the OECD mandate and
the interests of OECD founders are more likely to be invited to join
the OECD.

Not only does this project offer a substantive contribution to our general
knowledge of IGO accession, but it also propounds a theoretical framework that departs
from existing literature within the subfield. More specifically, World Polity indicators
have not yet been applied to the academic debate on the loss of national sovereignty
versus the gains to international status associated with IGO accession. The World Polity
framework, described in detail below, highlights and reinforces the potential role of
reputation effects in terms of describing this process. The paradigm suggests that, despite
the lack of central governance within the international arena, norms of international
relations prevail. In other words, actions by national leaders arise against a backdrop of
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precedent and international culture. The World Polity framework suggests that nations
operate within a broader contextual environment; one which is prone to isomorphism
across multiple substantive fields such as educational systems, environmental policy,
child protection laws, and professionalization of academic disciplines. These facts imply
that leaders of nations with strong ties to the World Polity may place greater value on the
role of reputation associated with treaty accession and IGO memberships, and are,
therefore, more likely strengthen this outcome by acceding to other IGOs. Thus, the
current project employs World Polity ties as a measurable proxy for the importance of
increasing status, and postulates a positive relationship between World Polity linkages
and IGO accession. Theoretically, this implies the following proposition:

H3A: Countries with greater integration into the World Polity are more

likely to be invited to join the OECD.

An extended discussion of the rationale for H3A is discussed below.

Overview of the World Polity Paradigm

The World Polity paradigm is best situated within broader theoretical work on
Neoinstitutionalism and Macro-phenomenology.

Both the Neoinstitutionalism of the

1970s and later work on the World Polity theory originated with thought by John Meyer
and a group of his Stanford University colleagues. Meyer articulated his emphasis on
social institutions as an effort to counter prominent theoretical trends within American
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sociology during that time period and to infuse previous research with a decidedly
phenomenological perspective (Jepperson 2002; Meyer 2010).
During the 1970s, contemporary thought had been largely influenced by the
importance of individual actors for constructing social outcomes, and the contribution of
socialization, or the internalization of behavioral norms, for understanding society. By
underscoring the role of individuals, American sociological thought during that time
period placed culture in the background. The reemphasis of culture in terms of shaping
society and understanding human action was the key impetus behind Meyer‟s seminal
contribution to the field.
Drawing on empirical work on educational systems (Meyer 1977; Meyer, et al.
1977; Ramirez and Meyer 1980), Meyer deliberately sought to shift the theoretical
emphasis away from the study of individuals and towards the influence of institutions for
understanding social outcomes.

He articulated institutions as collections of norms,

behavioral expectations, patterns of activity, and individual roles that work together to
form cohesive societal entities.

Although Meyer focused primarily on educational

structures, the concept is readily generalized to include other large-scale social
phenomena such as legal systems, familial arrangements, religious belief systems, or
domestic economies.
Meyer recognized, moreover, that these types of socially-generated systems are
not only universally recognized, but also possess inherent similarities across seemingly
disparate contexts. For instance, despite superficial differences, the terms government
and legal system are easily recognized based on function as well as structural similarities
regardless of the national environment in which they are found. In a similar manner, the
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institution of religion reflects similar properties and inherent structural characteristics that
are independent of specific ideology.
Meyer and his colleagues argued that this tacit set of universal definitions called
institutions both organize and orient societies while providing a flexible fabric in which
individual action takes place.

His particular focus within this phenomenological

perspective included that way in which we define schools as institutions, the
standardization of curricula across nations, as well as extensions to the primary institution
such as standard definitions of eligibility, subject mastery, degree conference, etc. He
stipulated that it was precisely this set of universal denotations that could not be fully
understood through recourse to individual action alone.
Furthermore, these concepts of social behavior and connotations had been largely
overlooked by contemporary sociologists of the 1970s. Thus, Meyer sought to return the
study of education to its roots in Durkheimian social facts. While reflecting on his
efforts, he wrote, “I did not think individuals were the fundamental units of society, nor
did I think they were tightly organized „hard-wired‟ structures. I thought society was
made up of knowledge and culture (Meyer [1999] as quoted in Jepperson 2002).”
Meyer and his colleagues delineated the emerging theory as a form of
neoinstitutionalism through a series of observations regarding educational systems (see
also Benavot, et al. 1991; Frank and Meyer 2007; Meyer, Ramirez, and Soysal 1992;
Ramirez and Meyer 1980; Schofer and Meyer 2005). In contrast with earlier work
defining formal education merely as a means of socializing individuals, Meyer redefined
educational institutions as systems of legitimation that serve to allocate individuals into
social strata (Meyer 1977).

In addition, later work by authors such as Benavot, et al.
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(1991) and Schofer and Meyer (2005) highlight (1) the global expansion of educational
institutions and (2) the growing isomorphism of educational curricula across national
environments.

Frank and Meyer aptly summarize these findings, “Our view helps

explain empirical phenomena that confound standard accounts: the university's
extraordinary expansion and global diffusion, its auricular and structural isomorphism,
and its relatively unified structure (2007).” Thus, both theoretically and empirically,
Meyer and his colleagues‟ research on education shifted the focus away from individuals
towards the phenomenology of institutions as constructions that ultimately organize
societies and propagate behavioral expectations over time.
Meyer and his colleagues took a deliberately macro-level, phenomenological
perspective on the organization of individuals and action within society. Similar to Emile
Durkheim‟s foundational recognition of social facts, Meyer and his colleagues adopted
the perspective that social elements are composed of symbolic units that tacitly represent
the way in which individuals identify social phenomena. It is the manner in which
individuals define concepts such as states, organizations, legality, or sovereignty that
creates a universal fabric in which social relations are situated. Put simply, it is the
solidification of legitimate connotations that both define and organize the world, and
yield predictions for the isomorphism of social institutions over time.
Meyer expanded the breadth of his phenomenological framework to encompass
global macrosocial phenomena- an orientation that readily addresses the subfield of
international relations theory.

In a manner similar to his original writings on

neoinstitutionalism, Meyer contributed to comparative macrosociology by providing a
theoretical alternative to paradigms that dominated contemporary international relations
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thinking throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Part of the inspiration for Meyer‟s seminal
contribution grew out of a need to understand the organizational and connotative
similarities of cultural elements across countries in light of the decline of modernization
theory as a development paradigm (Jepperson 2002; Jepperson and Meyer 2000; Meyer,
et al. 1975).
Modernization theory postulates that traditional ideologies and belief systems
prevent less developed countries from achieving economic growth. In addition, the
school of thought predicts that development occurs along a single, convergent path. As
growing nations relinquish traditional practices, they will develop over time to represent
levels of technology and social organization similar to western industrialized nations.
Scholars now recognize that it is both unrealistic and prejudicial to expect economic
growth and development to converge to an end point similar to Western nations. As a
result, modernization theory was eventually discredited due to its inherent
ethnocentricity. However, the need to explain the isomorphism of various sub-national
and international institutions across a range of developmental environments remained.
Meyer successfully delineated his phenomenological approach from existing
orientations that predicted the invariant convergence of economic growth and
development, i.e. modernization theory. In a coauthored work with Jepperson (2000) he
remarks,

“It is routinely noted (but as often forgotten) that the Western cultural framework
reflects the development, expansion, and secularization of the principally
religious models of Western Christendom, a sustained cultural evolution
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extending into the human rights movements of the contemporary period... This
differentiation

is

historically

associated

with

the

distinctive

ongoing

"rationalization" of cultural representations of nature, the spiritual domain, and
society.... By "rationalization" we refer to the cultural accounting of society and
its environments in terms of articulated, unified, integrated, universalized, and
causally and logically structured schemes.”

Thus, the World Polity paradigm effectively recognizes the global diffusion of practices
and institutions originating with potentially common sources.

Phenomenological

underpinnings are woven throughout this viewpoint. Proponents of this perspective
recognize and anticipate an „increasing structuring‟ of institutions on a global scale. This
implies that (1) governmental and non-governmental organizations should reflect various
degrees of organizational isomorphism over time, and (2) the concept of membership
within such groups should be incorporated into the standard definition of statehood, as
domestic actors are increasingly redefined within the international arena.

Meyer

recognized the presence of parallel cultural connotations across national environments
along with the importance of institutions for conveying culture and shaping individual
action. Both of these findings are reinforced by the underlying framework of the World
Polity.
Drawing on the importance of phenomenological connotations, and the existence
of behavioral scripts, the World Polity paradigm points to a fluid, evolving cognitive
framework in which individuals, domestic organizations and institutions, states,
transnational corporations, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental
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organizations exist. In addition, this framework provides an avenue for the conveyance
of socially legitimate practices.

Rather than being overtly normative, World Polity

theory provides merely a context in which qualities such as rationalization,
professionalization, and legalization drive the diffusion of both institutions and
legitimated practices in an international manner.
This framework has generated extensive empirical applications.

Numerous

scholars have enlarged the scope of institutionalist research and applied this
phenomenological perspective to cultural practices worldwide. Salient research includes
the study of child protection laws (Boli-Bennett and Meyer 1978); the rise of
professionalized psychology (Frank, et al. 1995); growing environmental institutions
(Meyer, et al. 1997); the rise of international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs)
(Boli and Thomas 1999); expanding scientific professions and research (Schofer, et al.
2000); membership within international organizations such as the United Nations and the
International Criminal Court (Lechner and Boli 2005); and the growth human rights
institutions (Koo and Ramirez 2009).
On a global scale, the World Polity framework necessarily reorganizes the way in
which individuals, organizations, and states are perceived within the international system.
For instance, Lechner and Boli (2005) comment on international actors as follows,
“...Many states are legitimate players, but none controls the game. It contains rules and
assumptions, often unstated and taken for granted, that are built into global institutions
and practices....Moreover, no single person, organization, or state chooses the rules it
follows; these are, to a large extent, exogenous features of the world polity as a whole.”
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One of the more important theoretical contributions has been the way in which
Meyer and his colleagues have redefined scholarly views of states and national
governments. Strang and Meyer (1993) state,

“For example, rapid diffusion within the world system seems linked to the
homogeneous cultural construction of contemporary nation-states.

States

subscribe to remarkably similar purposes - economic growth, social equality, the
political and human rights of the individual.

States are also understood as

possessing identical legal standing as sovereign, despite extreme disparities in
military and economic capacity. And while these cultural definitions can be and
are violated, they provide fertile ground for the rapid diffusion of public policies
and institutional structures.”

The current project builds upon this perspective while analyzing the nexus
between national governments and international organizations. To reiterate, the World
Polity paradigm predicts that both organizations and states‟ actions should reflect varying
degrees of isomorphism over time. Thus, it is possible that membership within sets of
international organizations, for example, may gradually become both a measure of
legitimacy for state actors and a expected standard for international relations.
Meyer and his colleagues provide a unique method of formulating propositions
regarding this process. For instance, consider a newly formed nation-state. What types
of international relations are expected of such entities? How are concepts such as state
sovereignty, boundaries, or legitimate governing bodies defined? How might a state be
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expected to interact with other national governments, corporations, non-governmental
groups, and international governmental organizations?
Macro-phenomenological views suggest that there are a common set of welldefined actions associated with the definition of statehood.

For instance, one may

observe that most states are members of the United Nations. This suggests not only that
United Nations (UN) membership is a fairly standard international practice, but also that
this type of international relation might be expected of newly emerging nations. A case
in point is the group of former Soviet bloc countries within Eastern Europe. After
gaining independence, each of these countries successively joined the UN. The present
research attempts to expand upon this perspective by asking questions such as, is treaty
accession a positive factor in terms of invitations to join an IGO? In addition, may one
associate this type of agreement with the notion that IGO membership has become a
standard practice among states operating within the international arena? An affirmative
answer to these puzzles implies that IGO membership may, in fact, be considered part of
the way in which one defines modern statehood.
The current analysis frames the World Polity as the force driving states to accede
to treaties and join international governmental groups.

Thus, the author equates

membership within the World Polity as best represented by participation in international
protocols. This project attempts to understand the relationship between OECD accession
and states‟ existing treaty agreements, and to test this empirical connection by predicating
contemporary membership upon existing participation in the World Polity. A potential
linkage between these types of memberships suggests that treaty accession is gradually
becoming incorporated into the way in which nation-states are defined within the
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contemporary world system. Thus, H3B provides a more specific elaboration of H3A
above:

H3B: Countries with greater participation in international treaties are more likely
to be invited to join the OECD.
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CHAPTER THREE
VARIABLE OPERATIONALIZATION AND MEASUREMENT

The Dependent Variable

In this case, the explanandum is the time elapsed until OECD accession occurs.
The methodology employed in the study, i.e. proportionate hazard rate analysis, centers
upon the time until an event, which is often labeled, time until failure. Thus, in terms of
the duration analysis, the year of accession is the failure, or event of interest.
Whether a failure occurs during a particular time period is by nature a binary
measure. Thus, the author constructed the dependent variable as a binary outcome and
coded it as one (1) if the country joined the OECD at any point during the current year t.
Note that this project employs the year of accession, not the specific month, as the
discrete unit of time. All time periods previous to membership were coded as zero (0),
while all successive time periods following the year of official accession were coded as
one (1).
It is worthwhile to observe that the route to accession is fairly complex, and, by
analyzing only the official accession date, this project may portray the process in an
overly simplified manner. For instance, although future members enter into enhanced
engagement status prior to officially becoming members, this data is not consistently
available or readily applicable to all nations within the OECD population. As a result,
only the 34 full member nations- not countries under enhanced engagement status- were
coded as positive cases of the dependent variable. For the sake of continuity, given the
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temporal dependence of events, enhanced engagement nations were coded as nonmembers.

Independent Variables

Selection of the independent covariates follows directly from the hypotheses
articulated above. From a substantive perspective, the author is primarily interested in
understanding whether World Polity involvement, ceteris paribus, significantly affects
the time until accession. However, in order to answer this question in an empirically
valid manner, it is necessary to control for other substantial factors that may drive
accession outcomes.

These concerns suggest the subsequent list of independent

variables. Table Two reviews the theoretical direction of influence of each variable upon
the rate of accession; while Table Three offers a detailed explanation of each variable
with its respective source.

Founding OECD Members

From a theoretical standpoint, the continued membership of OECD founders
within the organization is fairly straightforward. If one assumes that that states were
responsible for creating the organization, its mandate, and membership guidelines, then it
follows that they would have an interest in continuing their participation into the future.
These countries acquire substantial gains in prestige with minimal sovereignty losses by
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Table Two: Overview of Independent Variables
Hypothesized Relation to
Accession

Substantive Areas and Variables

Founding OECD Members

1. Founding OECD member dummy variable

positive*

Interests Congruent with the OECD Mandate

2. Per capita GDP

positive

3. Average unemployment

negative

4. Official aid and development assistance

negative*

5. Trade openness

positive

6. Degree of democratization

positive

7. Foreign direct investment

positive

World Polity Linkages

8. Index of eight international treaties

positive

*Note: A positive effect implies an acceleration of the time until accession; while a negative effect implies a
deceleration of the time until accession.
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Table Three: Variable Descriptions and Sources
Indicator

Variable

Description

Source

OECD
Membership

oecd

Dummy variable valued at one (1) if country
was a member during time (t)

OECD

Founding
Member

founder

Dummy variable indicating whether a country
represents one of the founding OECD
members

OECD

Per Capita GDP
(logged)

l_pcgdp

GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005
international $), logged

WB WDI

Average
Unemployment

unemploy

Unemployment as percent of labor force
averaged over the entire time span (simple
mean)

WB WDI*

Financial
Stability

aid

Official aid, net of repayments, and
development assistance received (percent of
GDP)

WB WDI

Openness to
Trade

openness

Sum of exports plus imports (percent of
GDP)

WB WDI

Degree of
Democratization

polity2

Polity score ranging from (-10) complete
autocracy to (10) complete democracy

Polity IV

World Market
Economy
Involvement

fdi

Foreign direct investment, net inflows
(percent of GDP)

WB WDI

World Polity
Index

wp_index

Composite number of IGO memberships
during a given year ranging from (0) to
(8)

Generated

*WB WDI is the abbreviation for World Bank, World Development Indicators Database (2010).
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maintaining their membership. As a result, the author proposed hypothesis one above,
which is more specifically expressed as:

H1:

Founding nations are likely to maintain their membership within the
OECD.

The author incorporated a dummy variable coded as (1) one for the twenty
original members of the OECD. Tables Two and Three summarize this measure. This
indicator offers utility on several levels. First, by controlling for the founding population,
the author is able to clearly delineate factors contributing to original versus contemporary
OECD membership. This answers questions such as whether involvement in the World
Polity was important to the original OECD population and whether it is significant for
accessions within the last decade.
In addition, the founder variable is especially useful given the fact that the data
are left censored beginning with the year 1980. The control for founding members
diminishes the effect of data lost by left censoring because all of the newer members
were admitted after the year 1980.

Interests Congruent with the OECD Mandate

The majority of other indicators follow directly from goals articulated by the
organization itself.

Intuitively, the author anticipates that countries displaying

characteristics similar to those that the organization directly endorses will be most likely
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to receive future membership invitations. This line of reasoning is consistent with the
second hypothesis, which is more specifically expressed as:

H2: Countries with characteristics that parallel the OECD mandate and the
interests of OECD founders are more likely to be invited to join the
OECD.

OECD leaders (2010) have articulated the organization‟s primary mandate
through these criteria:

1.

Support sustainable economic growth

2.

Boost employment

3.

Raise living standards

4.

Maintain financial stability

5.

Assist other countries' economic development

6.

Contribute to growth in world trade

Elsewhere, the OECD administration has summarized its purpose as:

7.

Encourage democratic forms of governance

8.

Foster development of market economies (2010)
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Thus, variables chosen for this project highlight key characteristics from the eight points
above.

Economic Development

Not only is support of economic development highlighted as a key initiative, but
for many years the OECD population was composed of the most developed, highestearning countries in the world. It follows, therefore, that overall development would be
an important property of potential member economies.

This characteristic was

operationalized as per capita gross domestic product (GDP). Increased domestic earnings
are indicative of increased standards of living, sustainable growth, and overall
development.

Thus, this measure incorporates several of the OECD‟s stated goals.

Theoretically, the author anticipates that high levels of per capita GDP will be
associated with an increase in the rate at which a country receives a membership
invitation. This association is summarized in Table Two. Table Three reviews the
variable data and its source.

Average Unemployment

Raising the level of employment within domestic economies is highlighted by the
OECD administration as an important corollary of overall growth and development. As a
result, the author included average unemployment as potential covariate. In this case, the
variable represents a thirty year average, based on available data, not an annual average.
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The author constructed the measure in this manner to overcome problems with missing
data. A detailed rationale follows. Intuitively the author anticipated that unemployment
would be negatively associated with the dependent variable. Tables Two and Three
summarize this measure.
An additional word of discussion is warranted regarding data collection and the
way in which the unemployment variable was formulated. First, note differences in
general types of unemployment and their respective time-dependence. There are two
primary types of unemployment: (1) structural, or long-term job loss, and (2) frictional,
or short-term, unemployment. An example of structural unemployment might be an
economy in which domestic jobs are severely lacking over the course of several decades.
For instance, a long-run unemployment rate of sixty-five percent represents a highly
underdeveloped economy. Long-term rates of this nature reflect very low income nations
lacking in job opportunities for a majority of their citizens, i.e. structural unemployment.
This circumstance is a noteworthy contrast to domestic economies with short-term
unemployment ranging from two to ten percent. Unemployment numbers in this range
may be construed as frictional in nature, i.e. unemployment that arises temporarily due a
recession or the lag between ending one job and finding another.
The author was primarily concerned with the long-term level of employment, i.e.
the structural level, rather than minute annual fluctuations caused by frictional sources
such as workers relocating and searching for new jobs. Thus, a long-term average was
preferable to an annual value because not only are short-run numbers susceptible to
extraneous fluctuations, but long-run values are more indicative of the qualities that the
author wished to measure. As a result, there was a need to smooth the unemployment
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numbers both to reflect structural versus frictional sources, and model the overall health
of domestic economies over extended periods of time.
There are several methods available to accomplish this goal.

For example,

employment numbers may be divided into quartiles, or a moving average may be used to
smooth minute fluctuations. However, both of these methods require adequate data. As
shown in Table Three, this indicator was drawn from the World Bank‟s World
Development Indicators database. The data for this indicator were very inconsistent;
there were numerous missing values throughout the thirty year time span. In light of this
condition, the author chose instead to smooth the data using a simple mean applied per
panel for the entire series. This method overcomes the problem with the missing data
without resorting to imputation, and performs the necessary smoothing. Because the
average unemployment variable is not a true covariate, it should be viewed primarily as a
control.
Financial Stability

The author chose to operationalize financial stability as the absence of official aid
and development assistance. Thus the variable, aid, represents loans, net of repayments,
and grants made to national governments. The definition and source for this variable is
presented in Table Three. Development assistance and aid is often provided to countries
in order to encourage economic growth or to assist in recovery from natural disasters,
political regime transition, or internal conflict. Based on its states objectives, the OECD
is less likely to invite countries receiving large sums of financial assistance into
membership negotiations. Therefore, it follows theoretically that aid as a percentage of
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GDP will be negatively associated with both economic stability and the likelihood of a
future OECD membership invitation. This hypothesis is summarized in Table Two.

Involvement in World Trade

Trade openness is the sum of national exports plus imports as a percentage of
GDP. Because the OECD directly supports the increase it world trade, it follows that
countries displaying this variable should be associated with an acceleration in the rate of
accession. Table Two reiterates this proposed relation, while Table Three summarizes
the variable and its source.

Democratization

In addition, one must consider the role of governance in terms of the potential for
OECD membership invitations. While it is fairly obvious that most, if not all, of the
founding members have democratic political structures, during recent years, it seems as
though the OECD has moved away from its emphasis on one particular type of
governance.

The 2007 selection of China, an authoritarian regime, and Russia, a

tenuously democratic regime, for enhanced engagement status may be the most direct
evidence of this fact.
This apparent contradiction further supports the inclusion of degree of
democratization as an independent variable. Incorporation of this measure yields the
opportunity to observe the potential evolution of the organization over time.
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This

transition may include a redefinition of the OECD mandate; more specifically, a
movement away from the importance of democracy towards other characteristics. Thus,
the multivariate model may underscore the transition implied by historical descriptions.
To capture the importance of political regime as an explanans, the author
employed the Polity IV data collected by Jaggers and Gurr (2011). This dataset measures
key criteria across countries including (1) the regulation, competitiveness, and openness
of executive recruitment; (2) the degree of executive constraints; and (3) the level of
political competition.

For example, executive recruitment is considered along three

ranked levels ranging from unregulated/forced seizure of power; designated/transitional
accession to power; and regulated/competitive allocation of power. All other categories
are similarly coded to reflect relative levels of openness to public participation in the
government apparatus and the degree to which political power is subject to varying forms
of impartial regulation; a full description is available in the Polity IV Project: Dataset
Users’ Manual. Regime characteristics are transformed into a ranked aggregate ranging
from -10 (completely authoritarian) to +10 (completely democratic) and only available
for countries with populations greater than 500,000. Table Three summarizes the degree
of democratization indicator.
Although the past five years may reflect diminishing support of democratic
institutions, the OECD‟s long standing history reflects this predilection. Thus historical
membership patterns imply a positive relation between degree of democratization and
increasing rate of accession. Table Two reiterates this proposed direction.

Links to the World Market Economy
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Although, conceptually, linkages to international markets may be operationalized
through various avenues, the author chose to capture this type of economic enterprise
through inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI is defined as the process in
which investors engage in economic enterprises outside of their country of residence. It
may be measured in terms of both inflows and outflows. An example of FDI might entail
a factory owned by Canadian citizens that is located in the United States. From the
perspective of US citizens, this represents an inflow of investment; whereas, from the
Canadian viewpoint the investment is an outflow. The author elected to use only net
inflows of FDI. The term net refers to new investment less disinvestment (World Bank
2012). Additionally, the FDI variable is formulated as a percentage measure. This
obviates the need to standardize the net worth of the investment through inflation
adjustment and/or currency conversion. Thus, the final form of the indicator is net
inflows of FDI as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP).
Certain countries may reflect greater inflows of FDI for several reasons. Select
characteristics of domestic economies, such as favorable tax rates, contribute positively
to net FDI. In addition, some might argue that FDI is tool of growth for developing
countries. Here, the primary driver of FDI inflows is presumed to be the overall domestic
economic and political climate.

Conventional wisdom dictates that investors are

generally risk adverse; therefore, the author additionally anticipates that stable
governments and economies will be positively associated with FDI inflows.

This

relationship is summarized in Table Two. FDI, measured as a percentage of GDP, should
be associated with an acceleration in the rate at which countries accede to the OECD.
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World Polity Linkages

In addition to characteristics of nations that parallel the OECD mandate, the
author wished to test propositions regarding the importance of world culture and
involvement within international protocols for membership invitations. To review the
hypotheses from above:

H3A: Countries with greater integration into the World Polity are more
likely to be invited to join the OECD.

H3B: Countries with greater participation in international treaties are more
likely to be invited to join the OECD.

The author chose to operationalize World Polity involvement using accession to
international protocols. She chose treaties for this purpose based on two criteria. The
first was a desire to create variation within the measure itself. Variation in this instance
is the year of accession or the year in which a country becomes a signatory to an
international protocol. For example, the majority of membership within the World Trade
Organization arose during the years 1995 and 1996, which was shortly after its founding
in 1995. The author deliberately attempted to avoid this lack of variation.
The second consideration was the desire to include a range of substantive areas.
To accomplish this task, the author selected protocols that represent emerging goals, such
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as environmental protection agreements, that have arisen over the last several decades
rather than well-established mandates, such as formation of the World Health
Organization, within the international system. Substantive areas included in the index
represent environmental, legal, human rights, financial, intellectual property, and labor
topics. Although the author made every attempt to judiciously select entities for this
purpose, it is worth acknowledging the subjectivity of the World Polity measure. The
author selected a total of eight treaties, which are presented in Table Four.
Consistent with the survival analysis model, the author created a binary measure
for each international treaty. If a country acceded to the protocol during the given year, it
was coded with a (1) one. Every successive year following accession was also coded as
one. All years prior to accession, including the years prior to creation of the treaty, were
coded as (0) zero. The individual scores for each year were summed to generate a World
Polity index with values ranging from one through eight. Construction of the index
measure is summarized within the variable description in Table Three. As alluded to
above, a higher score on the World Polity index is will presumably accelerate the rate at
which a country is invited into OECD membership. This theoretical relationship is
reviewed in Table Two.

Technical Remarks

Finally, it is useful to comment on the mechanics of data collection and selection
of variables to be included in the project. The length of the times series, population of
countries, and independent variables were chosen with as much logic and planning

44

Table Four: World Polity Indicators

Year of
Establishment

Variable Name

Treaty or Organization

bc1992

Basil Convention

1992

Regulation of hazardous waste
transportation and disposal

cat1984

United Nations'
Convention Against
Torture

1984

Prevention of inhumane treatment or
punishment of individuals engaged in
conflicts

cedaw1979

United Nations' Committee
on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against
Women

1979

Promotion and enforcement of human
rights for women

fccc1992

United Nations'
Framework Convention
Against Climate Change

1992

Regulation of atmospheric greenhouse
gas and related environmental
protection measures

icsid1965

World Bank's International
Center for the Settlement
of Investment Disputes

1965

Resolution of legal disputes regarding
financial trade

mac1973

International Labor
Organization's Minimum
Age Convention

1973

Establishment of minimum age for
entrance into employment

rsw2002

Rome Statute of the World

2002

Recognition of jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court

wipo1967

World Intellectual Property
Organization

1967

Promotion and enforcement of
intellectual property rights

45

Description

possible. Yet, the selection process was ultimately subjective, and warrants a word of
explanation. The author created country-year panels for the years 1980-2010. Although
some indicators are obtainable prior to 1980, this year was chosen as the starting point
simply because of the greater availability of published measures. In addition, the total
population of nations also reflects the availability of information. For instance, the Polity
IV data set, which was used to represent the degree of democratization, is published only
for nations with populations greater than 500,000. This somewhat limited the countries
employed in the study; the greatest impact was the omission of Iceland and Luxembourg,
both of whom are OECD members.
Finally, it is necessary to discuss measures omitted from quantitative analysis.
The author attempted to control for criteria that reflect important political and economic
features of domestic economies. Several measures were initially included and later
discarded due to either severe missing data problems or high multicollinearity with other
key variables. Although imputation to correct for missing data was an option, it was
deemed inappropriate for this project. Measures ultimately omitted from this study
include quality of life indicators, such as life expectancy, literacy, secondary school
enrollment, and annual gini index score; social indicators, such as ethnic, linguistic, and
religious fractionalization; economic variables, such as net capital flows; and political
indicators, such as regime duration and investment risk. Thus, the final selection of
variables represents the best and most representative measures under limited availability
of data.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THEORETICAL OVERVIEW OF DURATION MODELS

Hazard rate, or survival, analysis is the optimal method for analyzing a binary
outcome, OECD member or non-member, over time. The following review is based
primarily on discussion of survival models presented by Greene (2008). Ideally, one
would like to analyze the effect of several covariates on some non-negative duration of
time T. Because time is explicitly non-negative, one is not able to assume that the data
are normally distributed, and must instead identify an appropriate alternative distribution.
If the random variable T has a continuous probability distribution f(t), then the cumulative
probability is F(t), which is equal to Prob(T ≤ t).

We know that the elapsed length of

time prior to the event is at least t; thus we may identify the survival function as follows:

S(t) = 1 – F(t) = Prob(T ≤ t)

From this function we can identify the hazard rate, which is conceptually defined as the
probability that the duration of time will end in the next short interval of time Δt:

Hazard rate = λ(t) = limit [Prob(t ≤ T ≤ t + Δt | T ≥ t)] /Δt
Δt → 0

Given the above we see that the hazard rate may be rewritten as:

λ(t) = f(t)/ S(t)
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where S(t) is the survival function and f(t) the continuous PDF. To reiterate, Greene
(2008) defines the hazard rate as, „the rate at which spells are completed after duration t,
given that they last at least until t. One can relate the hazard function, λ(t), the probability
density of the data, f(t), and the survival function, S(t), as follows:

λ(t) = -d ln S(t)/ dt

f(t) = λ(t) S(t)

Essentially, one wishes to estimate the survival function using the hazard rate.
Consequently, the area under hazard function (integrated from zero to t) may be
represented as Λ(t), where Λ(t) represents the integrated hazard function (Greene 2008).
Thus, one may represent the survival function as follows:
t

S(t) = e –Λ(t), where Λ(t) =

∫

λ(s) ds

0

Analysis of duration data is most often concerned with estimation of the hazard rate λ(t).
In addition, the majority of analyses assume that this rate is essentially invariant over
time. As a result, the conditional probability of the event over a brief interval is constant
regardless of when the observation is recorded (Greene 2008).
Survival analysis requires that one make general assumptions regarding the nature
of the hazard rate function. Although there are several ways of potentially modeling the
hazard function, such as the exponential, Weibull, lognormal, or log-logistic functions,
Greene notes that these types of specifications may not fully account for individual
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heterogeneity of observations (2008). One of the more popular methods of incorporating
sample heterogeneity into the model specification is Cox‟s (1972) semi-parametric,
proportional hazard model. Commonly known as the Cox proportionate hazard model,
this specification allows for the incorporation of a baseline hazard rate, λ0(t), which
explicitly reflects the individual heterogeneity (Greene 2008).
The hazard rate function takes the form:

λ(t) = exp(xi‟β)λ0(ti)

where (xi‟β) represents a vector of covariates. The hazard rate for the current study is as
follows:

λ(t) = exp(xi‟β)λ0(ti) , where
xi‟β = β1 l_pcGDPt + β2 opennesst + β3 polity2t + β4 avg_unemt + β5 aidt + β6 fdit +
β7 wp_indext + β8 foundert

For the general case in which none of the observations are censored, and only one
observation exits during any given time interval, the conditional probability takes the
form:

Prob[ti = Tk | risk set] = ex ‟β / Σ ex ‟β
i

j

j ϵ Rk

From the above equation, one may construct the log-likelihood function as follows:

49

K

Ln L = Σ [xk‟β - ln Σ ex ‟β ]
j

k=1

j ϵ Rk

Presentation of the log likelihood function for the more complex case in which data are
censored, and multiple observations simultaneously undergo the event is beyond the
scope of the current analysis. Fortunately, STATA statistical software provides a fairly
straightforward method of analyzing the likelihood function; the following analysis is
based on a more complex version of the above function.
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CHAPTER FIVE
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The author compiled data for a population of 131 nations over the years 19802010. The data are organized into panel-years. The explanandum, as described above,
was constructed as a binary measure coded as one (1) if a country was a member of the
OECD during a given year and zero (0) otherwise. The explanantia are described in
detail through Tables Two and Three.
First it is useful to summarize measures of central tendency with regard to all the
variables. Table Five presents the number of observations and descriptive statistics
associated with each measure. A few properties of the data are noteworthy. Namely,
observe that the World Polity index has a mean of roughly four (4) and a standard
deviation of two (2).

This finding indicates that the World Polity data are evenly

distributed, without skew in the distribution, and contain approximately fifty percent of
the index within one standard deviation- both of which point to the utility of the measure
from quantitative standpoint.
There are a few caveats as well. The full set of observations totals 4867 units. As
reflected in Table Five, most of the indicators have a few missing data points. Because
the lost information reflects a relatively small percentage of the full data set, 8.2 percent,
the author chose not to correct for the lost material through imputation. For the purposes
of this project it is also assumed that the missing data are random, rather than trending,
which obviates the need to correct for any underlying selection bias.
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Table Five: Summary Statistics

Observations

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

aid

4257

5.722372

10.1769

-0.6820754

148.4842

avg_unem

4306

9.423447

7.396358

0.5

51.5

fdi

4089

2.876006

6.073011

-82.8921

145.2019

founder

4867

0.1401274

0.3471548

0

1

l_pcgdp

4309

7.468007

1.591619

4.056728

11.02475

oecd

4867

0.1592357

0.3659333

0

1

openness

4217

76.61948

45.67861

0.1814151

445.9111

polity2

4555

1.527113

7.265487

-10

10

wp_index

4867

4.168687

2.552229

0

8

year

4867

1995

8.945191

1980

2010

Variable

Note: See Table Two for variable descriptions and sources.
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Table Five also presents measures of central tendency for each indicator. Two of
the indicators, per capita GDP and trade openness, have a large range coupled with a
high standard deviation. This finding implies high degree of variation across panels and
over time. When this type of variability is present, it may lead to heteroskedasticity
within the error variance of analytical models. To correct for this problem, the author
logged the per capita GDP variable. The trade variable was not altered because a log
transformation of a percentage is not statistically meaningful.
Table Six presents bivariate correlations for each of the indicators. From a model
building standpoint, one would prefer that independent variables both meet theoretical
expectations and display certain quantitative properties. For instance, the independent
covariates should be closely correlated with the dependent variable, while remaining
relatively uncorrelated with one another. However, it is not often that the quantitative
properties of all indicators are simultaneously ideal.
Observe the respective correlations between each independent variable with the
dependent variable, oecd. From the matrix in Table Six, note that the dependent variable
is closely related to three indicators: founder (0.9332), l_pcgdp (0.6763), and polity2
(0.4843), but the relationship with the key independent variable of interest, wp_index, is
negligible (0.1651). Intuitively, one might anticipate the high association between the
dependent variable and the founding member dummy. Similarly, the other two
correlations are readily explained if one considers the full OECD population. To this
day, the founding members compose the majority of the OECD population, and it is fairly
obvious that these countries are highly-developed, democracies. Thus, these numbers
seem to parallel prominent characteristics of the historical member population.
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wp_index

fdi

polity2

openness

aid

avg_unem

l_pcgdp

founder

oecd

1

oecd

1

0.9332

founder

1

0.6677

0.6763

l_pcgdp

1

0.0184

-0.1076

-0.1058

avg_unem

1

0.0528

-0.5954

-0.2817

-0.3006

aid

1

-0.0078

0.1723

0.1831

-0.1305

-0.0918

openness

1

-0.0314

-0.2849

-0.0065

0.4802

0.457

0.4843

polity2

1

0.0283

0.3644

0.0799

0.0901

0.0245

-0.0571

-0.0335

fdi

1

0.1737

0.3716

0.1151

-0.1511

-0.0098

0.2272

0.1256

0.1651

wp_index

Table Six: Correlation Matrix of All Indicators

In addition, compare the results illustrated in Table Six, i.e. the bivariate
correlations, with the theoretical relationship to the rate of accession as articulated in
Table Two. Table Six highlights that fact that most of the hypothetical conjectures are
empirically supported by the correlation coefficients. For instance, observe that the
associations of oecd with six of the eight indicators: founder, per capita GDP, avg_unem,
aid, polity2, and wp_index are correctly signed based on theoretical predictions. In
contrast, however, the openness and fdi variables do not reflect signs consistent with
theoretical predictions. In this case, both variables are negatively associated with the
dependent variable.

This sharply contrasts with what one would expect; especially

because the OECD overtly endorses these types of economic activities.
Yet, there are several plausible explanations for this finding. First, it is possible
that net worth of investment such as FDI is fairly similar across countries; but when
normalized as a percent of GDP the significance washes out.

This proposition is

supported by the fact the FDI is not closely correlated with per capita GDP.
Alternatively, it is likely that the bivariate correlations, which incorporate the full OECD
population, are dominated by characteristics of the founding OECD members- all of
whom are highly developed, democracies, whose GDP may, in fact, be composed
primarily of public spending- to the expense of trade- and whose inflows of FDI may be
relatively minimal.
Now, consider correlations among the independent predictors. Optimally, one
would prefer that none of the independent variables be closely associated with one
another. However, this is not entirely what is observed. Additionally, there are several
substantial associations that are relatively predictable based on the substantive properties
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of the variables under consideration.

Consider, for instance, the strong negative

correlation between aid and per capita GDP (-0.5957). Given the conventional wisdom
regarding aid and development assistance, it follows that countries with high overall GDP
would be less likely to receive aid- This fully substantiates the correlation. In a similar
manner the founder variable is closely associated with both per capita GDP (0.6677) and
degree of democratization (0.457). Again, these characteristics are alluded to above, and
are justified given the pervasive characteristics of the OECD founders.
However, there are several correlations that are somewhat more provocative and
worthy of mention. Consider the positive association between degree of democratization
and the World Polity index (0.3716).

Although the following propositions are not

specifically addressed within the context of this project; it follows theoretically that
democratic governments would be more likely (1) to engage in cooperative international
maneuvers, (2) to accede to international protocols, and (3) to embrace, within a domestic
context, the norms represented by the World Polity index.

These suppositions are

consistent with liberal international relations theory- a subfield of political science that is
not fully addressed here. However, at least superficially, one might anticipate that
democracies, as opposed to other types of governance, would be more likely to
demonstrate a high World Polity index score.
In addition, note the positive correlation between trade openness and foreign
direct investment (0.3644).

This connection is fairly ironic given the fact that, as

mentioned above, neither variable is correctly signed (from a theoretical perspective) or
correlated with the dependent variable in a substantial way.

This result, however,

suggests that FDI inflows and openness to trade go hand-in-hand, which may additionally
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point to similarities in domestic policy. Although this statistic is certainly noteworthy, its
full implications are not explored here.
Although the bivariate correlations hint at a series of potential relationships, one
certainly can not begin to draw conclusions without consideration of the complete time
series. Now, the author directs the reader to the results of the Cox hazard rate analysis
presented in Tables Seven and Eight. Table Seven presents the variable coefficients
associated with three alternative models; while Table Eight offers the hazard rates,
alternatively called odds ratios, associated with the models identical to those in Table
Seven. The coefficients for each variable in Table Seven may be interpreted similarly to
a multivariate regression.

In Table Eight, the hazard rates should be construed as

described above. To reiterate, a hazard rate greater than one represents an acceleration in
the time to accession; whereas a hazard rate between zero and one reflects a deceleration
in the process.
Model one includes all the independent variables with the exception of the
founder dummy variable. This version analyzes the importance of each indicator for the
full population of OECD members, not solely the group of newly admitted nations.
Because the contemporary members make up a small portion of the total OECD member
body, this model is dominated by characteristics of the OECD founders.
It is necessary to restate that Model (1) most strongly portrays the full OECD
population- not its recent expansion. In light of this fact, the author will postpone a
detailed analysis of the three research hypotheses for the discussion of results from
Model (2). However, without delving into too much detail, few remarks are in order.
Model (1) offers a portrait of the OECD as it has evolved since 1980. As demonstrated
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Table Seven: Cox Hazard Rate Analysis of Panel Data 1980-2010 (Variable
Coefficients)
Variables

Models
(1)

(2)

(3)

35.16***

39.36***

(0.0000)

(0.0000)

0.674***

0.3670

0.399*

(0.1740)

(0.2300)

(0.2060)

Founder control

Log of Per capita GDP

Average Unemployment

0.0092

0.0084

0.0107

(0.0376)

(0.0314)

(0.0383)

-0.933**

-0.861**

-1.157***

(0.3860)

(0.3990)

(0.2650)

-0.0034

-0.0021

-0.0013

(0.0036)

(0.0036)

(0.0051)

0.142*

0.0932

-0.253***

(0.0825)

(0.0936)

(0.0683)

0.0980***

0.0848**

0.0912***

(0.0331)

(0.0367)

(0.0241)

Official Aid and Development Assistance

Trade Openness

Degree of Democratization

Foreign Direct Investment

World Polity Index

0.224**

0.163*

-0.8420

(0.1020)

(0.0851)

(0.5730)

Interaction Term between World Polity and
Democratization

0.107**
-0.0511

Country Clusters

131

131

131

Failures

29

29

29

Observations

2824

2824

2824

Wald Chi Squared Value

48.60

infinite

infinite

201.3495

196.1375

190.9378

AIC
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table Eight: Cox Hazard Rate Analysis of Panel Data 1980-2010 (Hazard Rates)
Variables

Models
(1)

Founder control

Log of Per capita GDP

Average Unemployment

Official Aid and Development Assistance

Trade Openness

Degree of Democratization

Foreign Direct Investment

World Polity Index

(3)

(4)

1.86E+15***

1.24E+17***

0

0

1.963***

1.4430

1.490*

(0.3420)

(0.3320)

(0.3070)

1.0090

1.0080

1.0110

(0.0380)

(0.0317)

(0.0387)

0.394**

0.423**

0.315***

(0.1520)

(0.1690)

(0.0834)

0.9970

0.9980

0.9990

(0.0036)

(0.0035)

(0.0051)

1.152*

1.0980

0.776***

(0.0951)

(0.1030)

(0.0530)

1.103***

1.089**

1.095***

(0.0365)

(0.0399)

(0.0264)

1.251**

1.178*

0.4310

(0.1280)

(0.1000)

(0.2470)

Interaction Term between World Polity and
Democratization

1.113**
-0.0569

Observations

2824

2824

2824

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: These data are identical to those presented in Table Seven. All Chi-squared and AIC values are identical as
well.
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by the statistical significance of the model coefficients and the odds ratios greater than
one, in general, member nations are associated with high overall development (per capita
GDP), financial stability (aid), a high degree of democratization (polity2), and increased
involvement the world market economy (fdi) over time.

In addition, and most

importantly, this model suggests that the full population of OECD nations is closely
integrated with the World Polity. The coefficient for the World Polity measure (0.224) is
statistically significant, with a probability value of less than five percent (p < 0.05). In
addition, Table Eight demonstrates that the hazard rate associated with the World Polity
measure is greater than one. This finding underscores the fact that, for the most part,
OECD members participate in international affairs and accede to international protocols
shortly after their inception. Consider the trend lines presented in Figure One. This
graph demonstrates that, on average, OECD members maintain a consistently higher
participation in international protocols than their non-member counterparts over the entire
length of the time series. Without alluding to causality, both Model (1) contained in
Tables Seven and Eight as well as the trends in Figure One simply demonstrate that the
World Polity contributes to the portrait of OECD membership over time.

From a

theoretical perspective, this is exactly the result the author desires.
Now, the author turns to the model that highlights the subpopulation of OECD
members who acceded after 1993. Consider Model (2) presented in Tables Seven and
Eight. This version explicitly isolates the characteristics of more recent OECD members
using the founder variable as a control. For a description of this variable see Tables Two
and Three above. Because seventy-one percent of OECD nations were part of the
original population; this control is highly correlated with the dependent variable. Thus,
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Figure One: Comparison of Average World Polity Index Score for OECD Members
and Non-Member Nations

1980

1990

2000
Year

OECD Nations

Non-OECD Nations

Note: See Table Three for variable descriptions and sources
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2010

the measure of model fit, the Wald Chi-squared value, is a very large positive number.
Ironically, however, the addition of this control does not entirely remove significance
from all the other indicators.

At this juncture, it is beneficial to analyze Model (2) in

light of the research hypotheses.
Hypothesis Two stipulates that nations displaying characteristics consistent with
the OECD mandate will be more likely to receive membership invitations. Yet, Model
(2) offers mixed support for this proposition. First, observe that overall development,
operationalized through the log of per capita GDP (l_pcgdp), was not statistically
significant within this Model. This result is interesting on several levels. Not only is this
measure highly correlated with the dependent variable (0.6776), but it is statistically
significant in Model (1). Yet, Model (2) shows that, after controlling for founding
members, recent accessions can not explained on the basis of per capita GDP.
In fact, if we isolate the average income of recent OECD members in contrast
with the OECD founders and the overall population, we may magnify this trend.
Consider the plots shown in Figure Two below. Although it is obvious that recent OECD
members have a higher overall income than the population of non-members, it is also
apparent that the per capita variable is significantly reduced for newer members in
contrast with the OECD founders.

These data suggest that in recent years the OECD

administration has begun to look beyond overall development in terms of its membership
invitations.
Domestic criteria are key considerations for future membership invitations. As a
result, the author chose average unemployment (avg_unem) as additional predictor of
future membership invitations based on its consistency with OECD organizational goals.
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Figure Two: Comparison of Average Income for OECD Members and Non-Member
Nations

1980

1990

2000

2010

Year
Recently-Acceded OECD Nations

Founding OECD Nations
Non-OECD Nations

Note: Recently-acceded OECD nations begin with the year 1994.
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However, despite its theoretical appeal, this measure was not statistically significant in
any of the models. It is possible that the use of a thirty-year average severely limited the
usefulness of this measure; however, correction of the substantial missing data problem is
left for future research.
Another variable selected to reflect the primary goals of the OECD administration
was financial stability. This quality was operationalized through (the absence of) official
aid and development assistance (aid).

Observe that across the three models aid is

correctly signed, with the expected hazard rate, and statistically significant. Based on the
odds ratios presented in Table Eight, one may notice that, if aid is increased by one
percent, the ceteris paribus likelihood of being invited into the OECD drops by
approximately (100 – 42.3 =) 57.7 percent.
This finding regarding official aid and development assistance is certainly
nontrivial.

Although, from a theoretical standpoint, economic stability tends to be

synonymous with overall development, as supported by the high correlation coefficient
between aid and l_pcgdp (-0.5954), the absence of aid monies simply points to financial
self-sufficiency, not level of income. This distinction proves to be critical- Here one
observes that per capita GDP is not a significant predictor of new membership (details
below), whereas the absence of aid was one of the most substantial measures.
Another of the measures selected to reflect the OECD mandate was openness to
international trade (openness).

However, similar to the bivariate correlations, this

measure also presented surprising results within the survival analysis. In Model (2) of
Table Seven, not only was the indicator statistically insignificant, but its value was
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negative. The finding is paralleled by a hazard rate of less than one, which is shown in
Table Eight.
Despite the fact that this outcome contradicts theoretical expectations, there may
be a valid empirical explanation.

Consider trade as percentage of domestic GDP.

Perhaps other factors, such as public spending, dominate the economies of the OECD
members. Alternatively, it is plausible that OECD member nations have moved away
from trade in goods and services towards trafficking of capital and financial flows- a
feature of economies that is not captured in the current analysis.

Areas for future

research may involve the inclusion of factors such as government spending and financial
trade; however, both these measures are beyond the scope of the current project.
In addition to trade and overall development, the OECD administration has
stressed the importance of degree of democratization for future membership invitations.
Not only are all the founding OECD members unambiguously democratic in nature, but,
as recently as 2010, the OECD administration described „promotion of democratic
governance‟ as one of the pillars of its overall mandate. (OECD 2010) These facts are
not only supported empirically, but statistically as well.

The bivariate correlation

between democratization and the OECD measure is high (0.4841). In addition, Model
(1) indicates that degree of democratization is a significant characteristic of the full
OECD population.
Yet, based on the results of Model (2), this variable is not a significant predictor
of recent accession patterns. This finding is reaffirmed by the fact that the indicator has a
probability of p < 0.1 in Model (1), the framework that does not distinguish
contemporary from historical membership, and the significance vanishes in Model (2). In
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a broader sense, these data may be purely circumstantial, or, they may point to recent
modifications in the OECD mandate. It is worthwhile to observe that almost half of the
OECD members who joined after 1993 were former Soviet bloc nations. This implies
that the lack of democratization is primarily circumstantial, and may result from the fact
that these countries underwent democratic transitions in 1991.
However, it is possible that the statistical outcome has a more deliberate meaningone that may be associated with a transition in terms of organizational goals. As noted in
Chapter Three, the OECD admitted Mexico, a weak democracy with polity scores
ranging from 0-8, in 1994 and while inviting Russia, another weak democracy (polity
range from 3-6), and China, a state-centered autocracy (polity score of -7), into enhanced
engagement status in 2007. If we include the enhanced engagement nations, these three
cases comprise approximately twenty percent of the total new membership. Thus, the
survival analysis tentatively supports the idea that the OECD administration has placed
less emphasis on democratization in recent years. This, in turn, suggests that we may see
weakly democratic or non-democratic nations invited into accession negotiations in the
future.
Finally, consider involvement in the world market economy, which was
operationalized through foreign direct investment (fdi). Above, the author noted that this
indicator was closely correlated with the trade openness measure. Yet, despite their
bivariate association, incorporation of the two covariates into the survival analysis
yielded surprisingly different results. Observe that, in contrast with the trade measure,
the fdi variable was correctly signed, with the expected hazard rate, and statistically
significant across both models. If the amount of FDI increases by one percent, the
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likelihood of being invited into the OECD increases by roughly 8.9 percent. This statistic
suggests that, of the measures intended to depict the OECD mandate, world market
economy involvement is one of the stronger predictors of future invitations and eventual
accession.
Now, compare and contrast all six variables intended to articulate the
contemporary OECD mandate. Although the results regarding world economic market
linkages (fdi) and financial stability (aid) are consistent with what we would expect from
a theoretical standpoint, this finding is rather counterintuitive. Observe that only these
two measures, not overall income (per capita GDP) or degree of democratization
(polity2), are consistently associated with both the full population of OECD members and
the subpopulation of recently acceded countries. Furthermore, this quantitative outcome
contrasts sharply with the bivariate correlations (see Table Four), which would suggest a
strong relationship, through income and democracy, with the dependent variable.
Yet, perhaps this outcome is not quite so surprising when we consider qualities of
the recent OECD members. As discussed in detail above, new members display neither
the same level of development, nor the same degree of democratization, as the founding
population. It follows, therefore, that perhaps the contemporary aims of the OECD
administration are centered not purely on overall income or one type of governance, but
rather on more nuanced qualities, such as financial self-sufficiency, relative insulation
from economic shocks, and favorable international business environments- all of which
point indirectly to quality of governance and the long-run health of domestic economies.
Thus, the finding that the presence of FDI inflows and absence of official aid is important

67

for future accession patterns may also articulate a large portion of the Organization‟s
modern mandate.
Finally, recall the last and most critical research hypothesis: that of the
contribution of World Polity indicators and treaty accessions towards membership
outcomes. These propositions, in particular, depart from domestic criteria and refocus
the analysis on international dynamics. The World Polity index reflects a compilation of
eight treaties and international protocols. Underlying these initiatives is a set of normsshared beliefs on topics such as labor, human rights, environmental protection, and
international law.

Voluntary accession to these protocols symbolically represents

adoption of the norms they represent. Thus, the World Polity index attempts to capture a
cognitive milieu in which countries exist. It logically follows that countries with shared
identities within the international arena would be more likely to become members of
similar international organizations. In fact, from a descriptive perspective, the contrast
between OECD members and non-members in terms of World Polity index score is fairly
obvious. The author directs the reader to Figure Two. Note that the OECD member
involvement in international protocols is consistently higher across the entire thirty year
time span. It is this property that author attempts to probe in more detail through the
survival model.
Now, consider the results of the World Polity measure presented in Table Seven,
Model (2). The coefficient for the World Polity index is statistically significant, with a
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probability less than 0.1 (p < 0.1). In addition, Table Eight demonstrates that as the
World Polity index score is increased by one unit, the likelihood of being invited into the
OECD increases by 17.8 percent. The statistical importance is not as strong as in Model
(1), which combines both recent and founding OECD members, however the
configuration in Model (2) demonstrates that this measure is important, nevertheless, for
our understanding of more recent OECD accessions.
These findings reinforce theoretical expectations. If we assume that the World
Polity represents a general international climate, it follows that participation within this
context might result in outcomes such as the invitation to join an IGO. Results of this
nature offer empirical support for theoretical research on the role of IGOs and treaties
within the international system. As noted in detail above, scholars postulate the IGOs
provide intangible assets to their members such as reputation effects, legitimacy, a
reduced threshold for cooperative outcomes, networking opportunities, and norm
diffusion. Thus, if countries operate within such a collective environment then not only
should one be able to observe it in a quantifiable way, i.e. through the World Polity
index, but it should also be linked to overt outcomes, such as OECD membership- and
this is exactly the author observes.
As a slight extension of the above results the author invites the reader to consider
Model (3) from Tables Seven and Eight. This version tests the interaction between the
World Polity measure and the degree of democratization. Inclusion of this interaction
term is theoretically warranted for several reasons. First, it is a well-known fact that the
governments of the founding OECD members are unanimously democratic in nature.
Second, as recently as 2010, the OECD administration indicated its support of democratic
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governance in terms of its organizational goals. Finally, from a liberal international
relations perspective, democratic countries are more likely to embrace international
norms and engage in cooperative multilateral negotiations, than their autocratic
counterparts. Thus, it follows that World Polity involvement may be increasingly more
significant to the international agendas of democratic countries. This, in turn, may have a
greater effect in terms of accelerating the rate of accession of highly democratized
nations over time.
The modified model is as follows:

λ(t) = exp(xi‟β)λ0(ti) , where

xi‟β = β1 foundert + β2 l_pcGDPt + β3 avg_unemt + β4 aidt + β5 opennesst +

β6 polity2t + β7 fdit + β8 wp_indext + β9 (wp_index * polity2)t

The results of the proportional hazard rate analysis provide additional support for the
above remarks. Note the coefficient for the interaction term presented in Model (3). To
interpret this term it is preferable to use the model coefficients in Table Seven, rather than
the hazard rates in Table Eight.

Conceptually, the interaction terms suggests the

following types of research questions: (1) Given a strong degree of democratization
(polity2 score of 10) how does increasing involvement in the World Polity affect the rate
at which membership invitations are received? Alternatively, (2) starting from a point of
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high involvement in the World Polity (wp_index score of 8), how does increasing degrees
of democratization affect the identical process?
Suppose the author sets degree of democratization at 10. Now, she wishes to
analyze the role of increasing involvement in the World Polity. In light of Model (3), this
implies that the odds ratio is e

(-0.8420 + 10*0.107)

= 1.256. This suggests that for strong

democracies, increasing the World Polity index score by one point is associated with a
25.6 percent acceleration in the time elapsed until membership.
Now, consider high integration with the World Polity, operationalized through an
index score of 8. The interaction coefficient allows the author to calculate the effect of
increasing democratization on countries very involved with the World Polity. The hazard
rate calculation is: e(-0.253+

8*0.107)

= 1.8276. This suggests that for countries that are

greatly integrated into the World Polity, as the degree of democratization increases by
one point, the time elapsed until membership accelerates by 82.76 percent.
Both these findings are consistent with theoretically predicted relationships;
however the Model (3) should be interpreted with a degree of caution. Note that the
standard error for the World Polity coefficient in Model (3) is nearly one and a half times
greater that the error associated with the term in the other two models. Furthermore,
observe that, with the addition of the interaction term, the signs of both the polity2 and
wp_index coefficients change from positive (as in Models (1) and (2)) to negative (in
Model (3)). Both these features are usually indicative of high multicollinearity amongst
the predictors; which, additionally, suggests that Model (3) may not accurately portray
the true relationship amongst the data.
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As a result, Model (3) is included purely for illustrative purposes.

It is

worthwhile to note that, Model (2) reflects a more empirically accurate fit for the data,
and, therefore, is the better choice for the statistical analysis presented above. Thus,
although Model (3) underscores the importance of democracy and World Polity
involvement for OECD membership; it may not accurately capture the true relationship.
Clearly the connection is suggestive; however, further analysis is beyond the scope of the
current endeavor.
Prior to concluding this section, it is beneficial to summarize major trends within
the statistical results. Note that although the indicators for overall development (per
capita GDP) and degree of democratization (polity2) reflect strong bivariate correlations
with the dependent variable; neither is ultimately significant for the rate at which
countries accede to the OECD. In contrast, measures intended to capture connections to
the world market economy (fdi) and financial stability (aid) were revealed to be the most
enduring qualities of both founding and more contemporary OECD members. This
suggests that both the population of OECD members as well as the organization‟s
mandate may be evolving over time.
Finally, consider the relevance of the World Polity for the rate of accession. The
independent variable of interest, the World Polity index, was more critical to the
founding OECD members rather than to countries joining after 1993.

In addition,

interaction of this variable with the degree of democratization measure proved to be
highly significant. This is not only suggests that democratic governments are most likely
to espouse the norms and behavioral expectations represented by the protocols within the
World Polity index, but it also implies that strong democracies with high World Polity
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involvement are most likely to undergo rapid accession. Overall, the quantitative results
support the importance of integration within the World Polity for the rate at which
countries accede, yet measures of world market linkages and financial stability proved to
be a more robust association.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSIONS

The ongoing dynamic between states and non-state institutions, such as
international governmental organizations (IGOs), treaties, and protocols, is not fully
understood. As a result, the extant literature is riddled with projects analyzing the
decisions of national leaders to accede to such entities. Scholars question the autonomy
of IGOs within the international arena as well as the advantages of membership within
these groups. Although theoretical work abounds, empirical projects placing emphasis
on the autonomous behavior of IGOs are rare. Furthermore, studies that model the
initiation of membership from within the IGOs themselves are virtually nonexistent.
The current endeavor deliberately attempts to address this void.

The author

employs thirty years of country-level panel data, spanning 1980-2010, to model the rate
at which countries are invited into membership within a single entity, the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Not only does this paper offer
commentary on the interaction between nations and IGOs, but additional features, such as
(1) selection of the dependent variable, (2) the choice of research methodology, and (3)
incorporation of World Polity measures, represent unique contributions of the present
work.
As a political and economic institution, the OECD is a provocative research topic.
In terms of dependent variable selection, membership within this group is relatively
understudied in comparison with that of other more global IGOs such as the World Trade
Organization or the World Bank. In addition, OECD membership is both selective and
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self-initiated. These properties situate the organization as a true anomaly amongst IGOs.
Finally, the historical organizational purpose offers a nontrivial contrast to the
organization‟s contemporary goals. Technically, the group fulfilled its initial aims, to
facilitate post-World War II economic development, shortly after its inception. Yet,
rather than dismantle the group, the founding members remained relatively quiescent
until initiating the several rounds of new membership agreements beginning in 1993. Not
only is this recent activity puzzling in and of itself, but it also leaves the question of
organizational mandate relatively unanswered. Thus, several features of the OECD‟s
institutional organization and history contribute to its overall research appeal.
In addition to the above, the author argues that characteristics underlying recent
membership can not be fully understood by case study alone. Clearly, modeling IGO
accession through a population of members and non-members suggests a binary
dependent variable. Yet, the author moves beyond cross-sectional analysis, such as a
logistic model, in favor of a true longitudinal method, i.e. survival analysis. From a
methodological standpoint, this technique allows the author to model the membership
process through a slightly more sophisticated lens of organizational evolution. As a
result, the proportionate hazard rate analysis represents one of the unique contributions of
the study.
Statistics generated by the survival analysis offer a more complete description of
both founding and more contemporary OECD members. Included in the quantitative
investigation were indicators representing three key hypotheses:

(1) maintenance of membership by OECD founders,
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(2) conference of membership invitations upon countries displaying
properties consistent with the OECD mandate, and
(3) tests of World Polity involvement, and, its corollary, treaty accession, as
substantial factors in terms of accelerating the road to accession.

All three suppositions were proposed to accelerate the time until membership invitations
were granted. The author drew panel data to operationalize measures suggested by the
second hypothesis. For the final proposition detailing World Polity involvement, she
created an eight point index of international protocols. She chose eight treaties based on
variability in terms of accession rates and substantive focus. Topics included human
rights law, international property protection, environmental law, and resolution of
investment disputes.
The quantitative data suggested that rates of accession into the OECD are
primarily determined by world market economy involvement (fdi) and economic stability
[the absence of official aid and development assistance (aid)], both of which were robust
across both the founding population and contemporary membership models.

World

Polity involvement was strongly associated with the founding OECD members, but was
less influential in terms of shaping the contemporary population.
One of the more surprising results was the fact that neither overall development
(per capita GDP) nor democratization (polity2) was essential for contemporary
membership. This outcome was contrary to expectations, in part, because the founding
membership was primarily characterized by these two criteria, but also because as
recently as 2010 the OECD administration identified its mandate as “promotion of
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democracy and the market economy.‟‟ Thus, the statistical data suggest that perhaps
characteristics of more recent members are indicative of a shift in the organizational aims
as well. It is possible that the current OECD administration places greater emphasis on
world market involvement and financial stability to the neglect of other previous goals
such as democratic governance or national income.
Ultimately, however, the question remains, „Whither the World Polity?‟ What is
the future of the World Polity?

Does the World Polity matter for IGO membership?

Yet, this project provides only a partial answer. Although the hazard rate analysis
suggests that World Polity involvement is strong amongst founding OECD members, the
connection was not quite as robust amongst more recently acceded nations. In the latter
instance, integration within the World Polity placed a close second to other
characteristics such as the presence of foreign direct investment or absence of official aid
in terms of their effects on rates of accession. This implies that the World Polity, as it is
operationalized in the current project, may not be as critical for international relations as
proponents of this theory might suggest. Alternatively, it may simply solidify the OECD
as a true outlier amongst IGOs, and prevent generalization of the statistical results. Or,
perhaps, the quantitative outcome simply suggests that factors such as World Polity
involvement work in tandem with other features to create a more holistic picture of
accession, which, ironically, may prove to be the most empirically valid conclusion of all.
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